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INTRODUCTION
A central concept in seabird biology is the hypothesized zone of 
food depletion around breeding colonies, termed “Ashmole’s halo” 
(Gaston et al. 2007) or “Storer-Ashmole’s halo” (Elliott et al. 
2009). Ashmole (1963, 1971) proposed that, by their provisioning 
activities, breeding seabirds decrease the food density in the vicinity 
of breeding colonies. As a result, the rate of food delivery to their 
nestlings as well as their reproductive output is reduced. Storer 
(1952) showed that foraging area size was proportional to colony 
size, and, in accord, Ashmole surmised that provisioning intensity 
from a central place limits seabird population growth. Ashmole 
further pointed out that all the K-selected traits that characterize 
pelagic seabirds (single-egg clutch, prolonged incubation, slow 
nestling growth, deferred maturity) might be expected where food 
is difficult to obtain during breeding (see Ricklefs 1990). 
In spite of its supposed influence on seabird populations and 
life histories, Ashmole’s halo has been the subject of little direct 
study. Only a few empirical studies (Birt et al. 1987, Elliott et al. 
2009) have directly documented its existence in regard to actual 
prey depletion; another (Ainley et al. 2003) documented seabird 
foraging negatively affecting prey availability (reducing prey 
schools at the surface available to surface-foraging seabirds). 
Other studies (Lewis et al. 2001, Ford et al. 2007, Ballance et 
al. 2009) have inferred its existence based on comparisons of the 
foraging ranges of seabirds from colonies of differing sizes, and 
on the locations of adjacent colonies. This evidence all strongly 
supports density dependence via intraspecific competition for 
food as an important factor in these systems, but, as Ballance et 
al. 2009 point out, the proximate mechanisms involved have yet 
to be elucidated. These previous papers have variously invoked 
exploitation or interference competition (or both), but, with the 
exception of Lewis et al. (2001) and Ainley et al. (2003), were 
unable to distinguish one from the other.
Lewis et al. (2001) assumed, and Ainley et al. (2003) showed, that 
shoals of fish show escape responses after disturbance by foraging 
seabirds, either by swimming away or by going deeper. Taking into 
account the higher density of foraging seabirds close to the colony 
and the escape responses of the fish, they calculate the length of 
search path required to collect a load of a given size, and show that 
seabird trip time increases as the square root of colony size, which 
closely matches their observations. Ainley et al. (2003) directly 
measured food availability and showed that the prevalence of fish 
schools at the surface was lower around larger colonies, although 
schools were present at depth. They concluded that Prince William 
Sound has reached its carrying capacity for Black-legged Kittiwakes 
Rissa tridactyla, and that a higher kittiwake population would 
compromise access to prey by “passive foraging interference.” 
There are several possible (non-mutually exclusive) mechanisms 
of competition: (i) exploitation competition, in which predators 
reduce prey density by catching and eating them; (ii) interference 
competition resulting from seabirds disturbing prey and making 
them less available (modeled explicitly by Lewis et al. [2001] 
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Many seabird species breed in large colonies, from which they make repeated excursions to collect prey for delivery to offspring. This 
necessarily confines their foraging activities to a region around or near the colony, which is constrained by their powers of mobility. The 
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using a set of simple assumptions. In that model, prey density was reduced by exploitation alone: prey individuals had no explicit behavioral 
options with which to evade or elude predators, such as moving away from a zone of high depredation. The objective of the model developed 
here is to assess the role of prey behavior in the occurrence of Ashmole’s halo. In our model, both seabirds and their prey make strategic 
choices about foraging location: seabirds do so to maximize the delivery of prey to offspring, while fish do so to maximize fitness (growth 
and survivorship). The situation is a predator-prey game, because for both seabirds and fish the best choice of foraging location depends on 
the choices made by all other players. Our simulations show that the halo develops much more quickly and is deeper and stronger when prey 
individuals are able to adjust their location adaptively (i.e. to maximize fitness), than when a random (i.e. diffusion) process governs prey 
movement as prey density is altered by exploitation. These results broaden the conditions under which Ashmole’s halo could be pronounced 
enough to affect seabird biology.
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and what Ainley et al. [2003] meant by “passive” interference); 
and (iii) interference competition by seabirds avoiding each other 
in some way or contesting access to food behaviorally (“direct” 
interference). The latter is not considered in any of the previous 
papers, but it is a logical possibility.
A fourth mechanism is suggested by considering that, in the model 
of Lewis et al. (2001), neither birds nor prey are strategic agents 
that can make decisions. An extensive literature now considers 
“the ecology of fear” (e.g. Brown 2007) and shows that prey can 
strategically avoid areas of high predation risk without necessarily 
having to be “disturbed” by predators. For example, Antarctic 
penguins alter their foraging behavior during darkness, i.e. refrain 
from entering the water, because it is more dangerous (Ainley & 
Ballard 2012, and references therein). 
So far as we are aware, the only studies that have formally 
considered, based on knowledge about seabirds and their prey, how 
underlying processes might combine to create the halo are those of 
Lewis et al. (2001), Ainley et al. (2003) and Gaston et al. (2007; 
see above). Gaston et al. (2007) calculated the relative availability 
of prey as a function of travel distance from the colony at which 
the attainable delivery rate to the offspring is identical from all 
locations. The rationale for this requirement was that any location 
with a higher attainable delivery rate would quickly attract foragers, 
reducing the prey density until the attainable delivery rate becomes 
equal to that at other places. It is clear that, to make the delivery rate 
attainable from a distant site equal to that from a nearby site, prey 
must be captured more rapidly at the distant location. Therefore, to 
attract foragers, patches far away from the colony must have higher 
prey density than those close to the colony. Eventually, patches are 
too distant to make exploitation worthwhile at any prey density (see 
Ballance et al. 2009). Gaston et al. (2007) hypothesized that these 
relationships underlie the existence of the halo.
Gaston et al.’s model calculated the spatial distribution of predator 
(seabirds) foraging activity over a population of prey (fish or 
zooplankton). In their model, predators reduced prey availability 
by exploitation alone. Model prey were given no ability to evade 
predators (e.g. by increased caution, altered timing and foraging 
etc.; see Lima 1998) and so reduce their availability to predators. 
The objective of the current study is to assess the role of prey 
behavior in the occurrence of Ashmole’s halo. We develop a model 
to calculate the distributions of both predators (seabirds) and prey 
(fish or zooplankton) around a central place (island) to which the 
seabirds deliver their catch. We compare the resulting distributions 
of fish and birds along a transect from the island assuming that 
prey (a) redistribute randomly as they are depleted by predators; 
or (b) redistribute in response to the predation danger posed by 
predators, balanced against the improved foraging potential of fewer 
competitors. With random movement, prey availability is reduced 
primarily by exploitation, with an added random component that 
increases or decreases the exploitation effect. With predator evasion 
behavior, fish move away from zones of high predation to reduce 
exposure to predators.
MODEL DESCRIPTION
Model set-up
We developed a one-dimensional spatio-temporal simulation model 
to calculate how birds and fish (re)distribute from the island 
outward. We use numerical solutions of the model to study the 
transient dynamics (during N time steps) as the interaction between 
birds and fish approaches equilibrium. 
We simplify the interaction by assuming that the island and 
surrounding ocean are radially symmetrical, and by representing 
the various seabird and fish species as single types of predator and 
prey. Prey are referred to here as “fish,” but could be any type of 
mobile prey captured by seabirds. We assume that fish are able 
to move to or from the island but do not change depth or make 
themselves otherwise harder to capture. We assume that there is no 
direct interference competition; that each bird catches one fish on 
each provisioning excursion from the island; and that during the 
breeding season the number of birds is constant. We do not consider 
self-feeding explicitly. We assume that there is a constant input 
rate of food for fish, which is either (i) strongest close to the island 
(“upwelling”); or (ii) equal across the foraging range. For both input 
rate scenarios, we assumed that the total amount of food provided 
in the considered area was equal. We also assume that, in each time 
step, fish fully consume this food, and finally that fish move only to 
places where food is available.
Upwelling, generated by water flow around an island, is assumed to 
create a gradient of primary productivity, such that the prey (here, 
fish) have the highest food availability and the highest danger close 
to the island. We included this feature in the model to assess how 
important specific patterns of food availability for the prey might 
be to the formation of the halo. In some predator-prey games (e.g. 
Hugie & Dill 1994; see Discussion) food for the prey affects the 
predator distribution. 
Fig. 1. The island (innermost dark circle) is surrounded by circular 
sites that are represented as neighboring intervals along a one-
dimensional space. 
Fig. 2. Flowchart of the structure of the bird-fish game-simulation 
model. Reversing the order of the bird and fish redistribution steps 
makes only very minor differences to results. 
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Fig. 3. Initial fish density (left panels a and c) and initial bird density (right panels b and d) as function of distance from the island, in the 
cases in which (upper panels) the input rate of food for fish is strongest close to the island (upwelling), and (lower panels) the input rate of 
food for fish is equal across the foraging range. 
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The maximum distance from the island (with radius r) to which 
birds and fish can move is divided into s (= 25 in our model) 
rings of equal width Ds (Fig. 1). The area of the jth ring is 
Aj = p(r + jDs)2 – p(r + (j – 1) Ds)2 for j = 1,2 …, s 
and thus the surface area of successively more distant rings is larger. 
We model the distributions of birds and fish over these rings. When 
referring to fish and bird density, upper case F and B are used, while 
absolute biomass of fish and number of birds are denoted with 
lower case f and b.
Each model run consisted of 1 080 iterations (representing 2 h time 
steps over 90 d). In each time step, three calculations are made, in 
the following order: (i) bird redistribution, (ii) fish redistribution 
and (iii) fish biomass growth and depredation (Fig. 2). At the 
start of each simulation, all birds are on the island at site 0, and 
the fish are distributed over the successive rings j in proportion 
to food availability. In the case in which the input rate of food 
for fish is strongest close to the island, initial food availability 
declines linearly with distance from the island with proportionality 
 
factor 
 s + 1 – j 
s . In the case in which the input rate of food for fish 
is equal across the foraging range, initial food availability in the 
s rings is constant (Fig. 3). 
Bird redistribution
Each bird’s objective is to maximize the rate at which food is 
delivered to its nest. Our assumption of constant load size makes 
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this equivalent to minimizing the time required for a round trip. A 
round trip to site (ring) j consists of the travel time tt,j plus hunting 
time th,j. We represent the quality of each site j for birds as the 
reciprocal of the total round trip time:
qb,j = 
     1     
 tt,j + th,j (1)
The travel time to site j is a linear function of distance: twice the 
distance (dj = (j – 0.5)Ds) divided by the flight speed (v). The 
hunting time at place j is inversely proportional to the local fish 
density Fj(n) with proportionality constant h (hunting capacity). In 
the nth iteration step, site quality is therefore:
 (2)
In the first time step, the birds’ foraging effort is concentrated 
at the site closest to the island: with the highest fish density and 
shortest travel time, it obviously has the highest site quality. In 
successive iterations, birds redistribute as the quality of a site is 
altered by exploitation and by fish moving away from predation 
danger (see below). In successive time steps, some birds shift from 
lower- toward higher-quality sites. The number of individuals be,j(n) 
shifting away from site j at time step n is relative to the difference 
between current site quality and highest site quality: 
 (3)
These individuals are apportioned evenly over all sites with higher 
site quality; all individuals leaving the second-best site go to the 
best site, those leaving the third-best site divide evenly over the 
better two sites, etc. This process simulates the net displacement of 
birds toward higher-quality sites, with the displacement rate greater 
when the difference in site quality is greater. To improve the ability 
of the model to iterate to a stable distribution, a damping parameter 
pb limits “overshooting” by controlling the proportion of birds 
allowed to shift away from a site. 
Fish redistribution: fitness maximization
We compared simulations in which fish redistribute by random 
movement (represented as a diffusion process) with simulations in 
which fish redistribute to maximize fitness. In fitness-maximizing 
redistribution, the quality of each site j at time n for fish (qf,j(n)) is the 
product of the energy gained per time (gj(n)) and the fish’s expected 
longevity (1/mj(n)). The site-specific mortality rate at site j at time 
step n is mj(n), such that lifetimes are exponentially distributed. 
Each site j has a supply of food uj(n) per unit time and surface 
area, which either decreases with distance from the island so 
 
uj(n) = (s + 1 – js ) umax, or is constant across sites so that 
 
uj(n) = (s + 12 ) umax. The energy gain per fish is density dependent, 
 
namely uj(n) divided by the fish density (Fj(n)). The total 
mortality rate of fish is the sum of the background mortality 
(mn) plus the probability per unit time of depredation by 
a seabird. The death rate due to bird depredation depends 
on the current total fish biomass at site j (fj(n)), the current 
total number of birds at site j (bj(n)) and the time the 
birds need to catch the fish and deliver it to their chicks 
(tt,j + th,j(n)). Site quality is therefore calculated as:
 (4)
Fish are redistributed after site qualities are calculated, with no 
additional time or energy costs. Redistribution proceeds as follows. 
In the first time step, fish are distributed over the successive rings j 
in proportion to their food availability. In each subsequent iteration, 
the distribution is changed by moving fish from all sites except that 
with highest quality. The fish biomass fe, j(n) leaving site j at time 
step n is relative to the difference between current site quality and 
highest site quality: 
 (5)
As with birds, emigrating fish individuals divide themselves evenly 
over all sites with higher site quality. There is also a damping 
parameter pf (the proportion of fish moved from a site), fixed at 0.75 
to allow the model to more smoothly and easily move to a stable 
level. The value of pf is higher than that of pb, because birds are 
restrained to choosing a new location only after each return flight, 
whereas fish are free to move at each iteration.
Fish redistribution: random behavior
For a large population, the effect of random movement behavior is 
diffusion, which proceeds as follows. For the discretization of the 
diffusion process with diffusion coefficient D, the following general 
equation is used: 
 (6)
where Aj is the area of ring j and Ds is the width of the site. The 
change in fish biomass in site j (= 2,…, s-1) is the result of flows 
from or to the sites closer to or further from the colony than site 
j. The movement of fish biomass f from one site to another is 
linearly related to the difference between fish densities F (sites 
are not of equal area, and so densities and total biomass are not 
interchangeable). For sites at the boundary of the simulation domain 
(j =1 or j = s), the equations are simplified to:
 (7)
 (8)
Fish population change
The amount of food in kilograms per unit area per unit time in ring j 
is (uj(n)) and is assumed to be divided equally among the fish there, 
being converted into fish biomass with proportionality factor 1. The 
change in the total fish biomass in ring j from step n to step n+1 
(time step length Dn) is given by:
fj(n + 1) = fj(n) + Dn (uj(n)Aj – mfj(n)) (9)
qb,j (n) = 
       1        =         1         =     hvFj(n)    
 tt,j + th,j (n) 2dj  +   1    2djhFj(n) + v
 v hFj(n)
 max (qb,j (n)) – qb,j(n)
be,j (n) = pb ( j                            )        max (qb, j (n)) j
qf,j(n) = gj(n)mj(n)
-1 = uj(n) mj(n)
-1 = uj(n)  (mn +        bj(n)          )-1 Fj(n) Fj(n) fj(n)(tt,j + th,j (n))
 max (qf,j (n)) – qf,j (n)
fe, j (n) = pf ( j                            )            max (q f, j (n)) j
f1(n
+) = f1(n) + DDn 
(F2(n) – F1(n))(A2 + A1)
 Ds2
fs(n
+) = fs(n) + DDn 
(Fs–1(n) – Fs(n))(As–1 + As)
 Ds2
fj(n
+) = fj(n) + DDn 
(Fj–1(n) – Fj(n))(Aj–1 + Aj) – (Fj(n) – Fj+1(n))(Aj + Aj+1)
 Ds2
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Predation by seabirds takes place after redistribution of fish, using 
updated fish densities Fj(n + 1) (= fj(n + 1)/Aj).
Parameterization 
All parameters, their description and their default values are listed 
in Table 1. These values are not intended to represent particular 
species, but to represent a general situation. 
Analysis
The aim of our analysis is to compare the development and 
shape of Ashmole’s halo between the two basic scenarios in 
which (a) fish diffuse (random behavior), or (b) in which fish are 
strategists that exhibit fitness-maximization behavior. We compare 
these using the default parameter set. To provide a sensitivity 
analysis, we randomly drew 100 combinations of parameter values 
TABLE 1
Parameters and state variables of a model of Ashmole’s halo
Parameter Description Unit Value
a Aj area of site j km2 p((r+j)2-(r+j-1)2)
bini initial number of birds (1 per 1000 kg fish) – 15
D diffusion coefficient km2 h-1 1.2
dj distance of midpoint of site j to the island km (j-0.5) Ds
fini initial biomass of fish kg 15 000
Dn duration of time step h 2
Ds width of each ring around the island km 0.08
h hunting capacity km2 h-1 0.0001
mn natural death h-1 1/21 900
N number of time steps (for 90 days) – 1 080
pb proportion of birds taking a decision each time step – 0.1
pf proportion of fish taking a decision each time step – 0.75
r radius of the island km 24
s total number of sites – 25
s·Ds maximum distance birds and fish can dwell km 4
tt,j travel time for return trip to site j h 2 dj/v
umax fish biomass increase per time step of site with maximum food availability 
(first site)
kg h-1 km-2 10
v flight velocity km h-1 60
State variable Description
b be,j(n) number of birds emigrating from site j at time step n
bj(n) number of birds in site j at time step n
fe,j(n) fish biomass emigrating from site j at time step n
fj(n) fish biomass in site j at time step n
Fj(n) density of fish in site j at time step n
gj(n) gain per fish in site j at time step n
mj(n) site-specific mortality rate in site j at time step n
qf,j(n) quality of site j from fish’s perspective
qb,j(n) quality of site j from bird’s perspective
th,j(n) site-specific hunting time in site j at time step n
uj(n) upwelling rate of food per area in site j at time step n
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from uniform distributions between a minimum and maximum 
value (Table 2), and compared the outcomes of random and 
fitness-maximization simulation runs. We examined the resulting 
distributions for differences in shape.
TABLE 2
Default values and variation range of parameters varied in the pairwise comparison
Parameter Meaning Default value Minimum Maximum
v flight velocity 60 30 90
h hunting capacities 0.0001 0.00005 0.00015
umax fish biomass increase per time step of site with maximum food 
availability (first site)
10 5 15
mn natural death 2/(24 × 5 × 365) 2/(24 × 8 × 365) 2/(24 × 2 × 365)
D diffusion coefficient 1.2 0.2 2
rbf number of birds per kg fish biomass 0.001 0.0005 0.0015
Fig. 4. The development of prey and predator distributions when fish movement is random, shown after various time periods (see key on 
graphs). Fish densities (left panels a and c) and bird densities (right panels b and d) are shown as function of distance from the island, in the 
cases in which (upper panels) the input rate of food for fish is strongest close to the island, and (lower panels) the input rate of food for fish 
is equal across the foraging range. 
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Predictions
We expected (i) that the halo would be deeper and larger when 
fitness-maximization behavior of fish is included, (ii) that the 
halo would develop more rapidly when the fish exhibit fitness-
maximization behavior, and (iii) that the fish stock will decrease less 
with fitness-maximization behavior than when they move randomly. 
RESULTS 
Random behavior
Starting from the initial fish and bird density distributions shown 
in Figure 3, we show in Figure 4 the progression of fish and 
seabird distributions as iterations proceed, assuming random fish 
redistribution. The development of the bird distribution is very 
similar whether there is upwelling (Fig. 4b) or not (Fig. 4d). With 
upwelling, the fish distribution initially increases strongly with 
distance from the island, but flattens and acquires the sigmoidal 
shape typical of diffusion processes by iteration 360 (~ day 30). 
If diffusion were the only process taking place, the equilibrium 
density of fish would eventually be equal everywhere, but here 
predation and growth give the distribution its shape, with the 
furthest sites eventually having the highest fish density. With 
no upwelling, the halo starts to develop immediately, because 
fish started out with equal densities throughout the considered 
region. By day 90, the shape of the halo is similar with and 
without upwelling.
Fig. 5. The development of prey and predator distributions when fish exhibit fitness-maximizing behavior, shown after various time periods 
(see key on graphs). Fish densities (left panels a and c) and bird densities (right panels b and d) are shown as function of distance from the 
island, in the cases in which (upper panels) the input rate of food for fish is strongest close to the island, and (lower panels) the input rate of 
food for fish is equal across the foraging range. 
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Fitness maximization
We show in Figure 5 the progression of fish and seabird distributions 
as iterations proceed, assuming that fish redistribution maximizes 
fitness. The development of the bird distribution is very similar 
whether there is upwelling (Fig. 5b) or not (Fig. 5d). The 
development of the fish distributions is also similar whether there 
is upwelling (Fig. 5a) or not (Fig. 5c), but the halo develops more 
quickly without upwelling. With upwelling, a steep drop-off in fish 
density is apparent at the furthest sites.
The most marked differences between the random and fitness-
maximizing scenarios are in the fish distribution, which shifts much 
further away from the island and does so more quickly (cf. Figs. 4 and 
5) under the fitness-maximizing scenario. As expected, fish density 
increases with distance (Fig. 6a,c), in such a way that the inverse 
of fish density falls linearly with distance over most of the range 
(Fig. 6b,d). The sharp decrease over the last three sites in Figure 6a 
arises because they lie beyond the maximum foraging range of the 
birds. Site quality for the birds is defined as the inverse of the sum of 
the handling and travel times. Travel time tt increases linearly with 
distance, setting a boundary condition beyond which hunting time 
cannot be short enough to offset the longer travel time. Beyond this 
point, the fish distribution is determined only by the food availability. 
Without upwelling, however, this effect does not arise, as the fish 
spread out over the entire foraging range. 
Sensitivity analysis
To provide a sensitivity analysis, we randomly drew 100 
combinations of relevant parameter values from uniform 
distributions between the minimum and maximum values given in 
Fig. 6. Fish density (panels a and c) and the inverse of the fish density (panels b and d) at n = 360 for the default parameter values. This 
shows that the increase of fish density over space is such that its inverse is linear.
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Table 2. We investigated how often four basic features developed 
in the 100 simulations, and compared the outcomes between 
random and fitness-maximization simulation runs. The four basic 
features are shown in Figure 7. They are:
Feature 1  Bird density drops off steeply after the first site.
Feature 2 Bird density increases over part of the foraging range 
(i.e. has a hump).
Feature 3 Bird density is high close to the island, and falls 
abruptly to zero partway through the foraging range.
Feature 4 The highest fish density co-occurs with the maximum 
range that birds use, and thereafter falls.
We considered the robustness of these differences between random 
and adaptive fish movement by investigating how often these features 
were present in the 100 simulations with randomly drawn parameters. 
We report the results for randomization and fitness maximization, 
after 360 iteration steps and after 1 080 iteration steps. 
Feature 1 In all cases, under both randomization and fitness-
maximization, the first site had the highest bird density. 
However, the decrease from the first to the second 
Fig. 7. Basic features of the distributions of fish and seabirds emerging after 360 iterations for the four scenarios. The numerals 1 to 4 indicate 
these features, which are discussed in the main text. Panels (a and c) show random behavior and panels (b and d) fitness-maximizing behavior. 
In the upper panels, the input rate of food for fish is strongest close to the island (upwelling), and in the lower panels, the input rate of food for 
fish is equal across the foraging range. The total input over the area is equal in both cases. Densities have been rescaled for portrayal. 
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site is abrupt under random fish movement, and much 
smoother under fish fitness-maximization.
Feature 2 Under randomization, a hump in the bird density 
was present in 97 out of 100 simulations at 360 
iterations. The three cases lacking a hump were 
those with a high diffusion co-efficient and low 
flight speed. The hump later appeared in these three 
simulations and was present at 1 080 iteration steps. 
Under fitness-maximization, in contrast, there were 
only nine simulations that displayed any sort of a hump 
somewhere along the bird distribution. In all cases, 
the hump was very small and the effect can likely be 
ascribed to local instability. 
Feature 3  Under fitness-maximization, birds always range 
to the maximum distance (site 25; occasionally 
numbers are very low), but when fish exhibit random 
behavior, birds do not range nearly this far, reaching 
on average to site 12 after 360 iteration steps and site 
14 after 1 080 iteration steps. Both fish and birds are 
distributed further out when the fish exhibit fitness-
maximization behavior. The 50% distance (dividing 
the fish population in two) is around site 20 when 
the fish exhibit fitness-maximization and around 
site 18 when the fish exhibit random behavior. For 
the birds, this 50% distance is around sites 9 and 7, 
respectively. 
Fig. 8. Panels a and c: fish densities at n = 23 (~ 2 d) for fitness-maximizing behavior (•) and random behavior (•). Panels b and d: fish 
densities in the second site in the first 7 days for fitness-maximizing behavior (•) and random behavior (•).
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Feature 4 Under random behavior, the highest fish density is 
further out than the maximum bird range in 93 out of 
100 simulations at 360 iteration steps, and 100 out of 
100 simulations at 1 080 iteration steps. Under fitness-
maximization this never occurs. When the fish conduct 
random behavior, the birds on average do not go out 
further than site 13 or 14, whereas the fish density is 
still increasing from that point on.
The appearance of these four features without upwelling (lower 
panels, Fig. 7) is nearly identical, the sole exception being that with 
upwelling there is a sharp drop-off in fish density at the far end of 
the foraging range (Fig. 7b), while this does not occur when food 
input is equal across the foraging range (Fig. 7d). With fitness-
maximization, birds range much further than under random fish 
movement, the halo is deeper and stronger, and these features do 
not appear sensitive to the parameter values chosen under any of 
the four basic scenarios. 
Halo development
Using the default parameter set, the halo develops much more 
quickly when fish exhibit fitness-maximizing behavior than when 
they move randomly. Figures 8a,c show the distribution of fish 
after 23 (~2d) iterations, as well as (Fig. 8b,d) the course of events 
at the second site. This comparison also reveals that the change is 
smoother when fish move randomly. Under fitness-maximization, 
instability is evident, although it is small enough not to disturb the 
general pattern. 
Fish population dynamics
The fish population declines more quickly when the fish move 
randomly than when they make fitness-maximizing movements. 
When moving randomly, on average 70% of fish are still alive after 
360 iterations and 53% after 1 080 iterations, while the equivalent 
figures under fitness-maximization are 91% and 78%. 
DISCUSSION
Our results show that Ashmole’s halo develops more deeply and 
quickly around a seabird colony when prey have the capability of 
responding to the presence of seabirds by moving adaptively (i.e. 
to increase fitness) rather than by moving randomly. Our sensitivity 
analysis further suggests that this is a robust conclusion, not strongly 
dependent on any of the parameter values. Previously, Gaston et al. 
(2007) showed theoretically that Ashmole’s halo develops under 
a broad range of conditions even if prey did not move. Here, we 
found that without any adaptive movement the fish population 
was reduced by 53%, but with adaptive movement it was reduced 
by only 22%. While these quantities obviously depend on the 
parameter values and simulation procedure, the effect of adaptive 
movement is clearly significant and strengthens the halo effect, 
although fewer fish are consumed by the predators. Our results 
suggest that the phenomenon is as profound as Ashmole (1963) 
originally surmised, and so able to affect seabird life histories.
The only other direct analyses of Ashmole’s halo are those of Lewis 
et al. (2001) and Ainley et al. (2003). Their model assumes that prey 
respond to disturbance from predators either by swimming away 
or by moving deeper; in either case, their availability to predators 
is temporarily reduced. Ainley et al. (2003) showed that, in fact, 
fewer herring schools Clupea harengus are found at the surface 
where surface-foraging kittiwakes are intensively foraging, as a 
function of proximity to the colony. The fitness-maximizing version 
of the model developed here in effect assumes that prey assess the 
“danger” level (i.e. the mortality rate that they would experience if 
they undertook no predator evasion; see Lank & Ydenberg 2003) 
and respond accordingly: no direct encounter with a predator is 
required — although, of course, such encounters would inform their 
estimate of the danger. Our model makes no specific assumptions 
about how the information is acquired, but a variety of sources are 
possible, including the behavior of conspecifics. 
Although the details of the competitive mechanism are slightly 
different, both the model of Lewis et al. (2001) and that presented 
here develop halos around seabird colonies. The halo in our model 
develops quickly, while Lewis et al. (2001) state that when fish 
respond by lateral swimming “a slowly growing halo is readily 
generated.” However, model details are sufficiently different that 
the meaning of “quick” versus “slow” is not at all clear. Lewis et al. 
(2001) add “that factors such as currents or disturbance by other 
predatory species may effectively mix shoals to such an extent 
that halo patterns do not form clearly.” (For example, the arrival of 
foraging whales increases trip length, i.e. halo size, in penguins; 
Ainley et al. 2006.) Lewis et al. (2001) claim that, because each 
seabird requires approximately the same total area to obtain food, 
independent of colony size, their basic result (trip time increases 
as the square root of colony size) holds. However, their brief 
presentation of results does not include many details. 
One possibility that might affect halo development is whether prey 
are benthic or schooling fish. The study of Birt et al. (1987), one 
of only three that have directly measured a halo, concerned benthic 
fish; the study by Ainley et al. (2003) concerned schooling, pelagic 
fish. It seems likely that both types of prey would have behavioral 
mechanisms that reduce their availability to predators, but these are 
likely to be rather different (e.g. hiding versus fleeing) and so would 
affect halo development. 
When prey as well as predators are strategic agents, their interaction 
should be considered in an evolutionary game theoretical context 
(Nowak & Sigmund 2004). In a predator-prey game, the decisions 
of individual prey depend not only on those of other prey, but also 
on decisions made by predators, and vice versa. Although there are 
intellectual predecessors, the first paper that explicitly formulated 
predator-prey interactions as a predator-prey game was that of 
Hugie & Dill (1994; see also Sih 1998). Subsequent investigations 
have applied predator-prey game models to specific systems such 
as desert rodents facing snakes, foxes and owls (Bouskila 2001, 
Kotler et al. 2002), Antarctic krill Euphausia superba and penguins 
(Alonzo et al. 2003), and tadpoles and dragonflies (Hammond et 
al. (2007).
The basic concept of the spatial game modeled here is the “ideal 
free” distribution (IFD; Milinski & Parker 1991). When sites have 
associated predation danger in addition to food availability, fitness 
at equilibrium is equalized as in the basic IFD model, with fitness 
having both resource-gain and survival components (Grand 2002). 
But because the level of predation danger at any site depends on 
the behavior of the predators themselves, the distribution game 
of both prey and predators must be considered. Predator-prey 
gaming models retain the essential properties of the IFD in that, at 
equilibrium, no individual can benefit from (unilaterally) moving to 
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a different site (Nash equilibrium). Some models also demonstrate 
that the equilibrium is stable to invasion by initially rare alternative 
tactics (an evolutionary stable strategy or ESS; technical details 
and exact definitions in Houston & MacNamara 1999). Our model 
suggests that the basic properties of Ashmole’s halo arise in a 
predator-prey game. 
The most straightforward way to test these ideas would be to 
estimate in a field situation the contributions of prey depletion and 
the anti-predator behavior of the prey to the delivery rate achieved by 
provisioning seabirds. For example, prey density might be reduced 
by exploitation everywhere, but prey might also take evasive action 
by residing at deeper depths (e.g. Ainley et al. 2003, Elliott et al. 
2009), or reducing the amount of time they spent feeding at the 
surface, where they are more vulnerable. With information on this 
and the foraging behavior of the predators, it would in principle 
be possible to compute the contribution of each to halo formation. 
Our basic prediction is that prey behavior contributes strongly to 
the effect. Considering that, as originally formulated, Ashmole’s 
hypothesis does not consider prey behavior at all, this would be an 
interesting exercise. 
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